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A VOTE FOR CLARITY:  
ESTABLISHING A FEDERAL TEST 
FOR INTERVENTION IN 
ELECTION-RELATED DISPUTES 
Ben Klein* 
 
Increasingly, state and federal courts are asked to resolve election-related 
disputes, as candidates are more likely than ever before to challenge some 
aspect of the administration of an election in court.  Election-related 
litigation puts judges in the unfavorable position of kingmaker, forcing the 
court, not the people, to determine the winner of an election.  When the court 
intervenes in an election dispute, the public may perceive the court’s 
intervention as a political act that decreases the legitimacy of the winning 
candidate and the election system as a whole.  Moreover, research reveals 
that judicial decision-making at both the state and federal levels can be 
skewed by party loyalty. 
Typically, election-related lawsuits are brought in state court because 
election administration is a matter of state and local control.  Occasionally, 
however, federal courts are called to review an election dispute in which a 
candidate or voters allege that the administration of the election resulted in 
an infringement of constitutionally protected rights.  While nonintervention 
is the default in federal court, under certain rare circumstances federal 
courts have determined intervention to be appropriate.  The federal judiciary 
has never, however, clearly established a test for determining when 
intervention is warranted. 
This Note explores the federal courts’ reluctance to intervene in election 
disputes through the lens of a recent Second Circuit decision:  Pidot v. New 
York Board of Elections.  Ultimately, this Note concludes that federal courts 
should adopt an explicit two-part test to determine whether (1) the state 
corrective procedure adequately protected the constitutional interests of 
candidates and voters and (2) nonintervention would result in fundamental 
unfairness to the voters. 
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Thanks to Professors Jerry Goldfeder and Michael W. Martin for providing guidance 
throughout the writing of this Note and to the Fordham Law Review editors for helping to 
prepare the Note for publication.  Also, thanks to my friends and family for their ongoing love 
and support. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the spring of 2016, Philip Pidot was running for Congress in New 
York’s third congressional district.1  A primary election was scheduled for 
June 28, 2016 (the “June 28 primary”), to determine if Pidot or his opponent, 
Jack Martins, would become the Republican nominee.2  In New York, a 
congressional candidate must submit a “designating petition” with a certain 
number of signatures before earning a spot on the primary ballot.3 
 
 1. Complaint para. 1, Pidot v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, No. 16-cv-859 (N.D.N.Y. 
Aug. 31, 2016). 
 2. Id. 
 3. A designating petition must meet certain formal requirements in accordance with New 
York election law. See Rivera-Powell v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Elections, 470 F.3d 458, 461 (2d Cir. 
2006).  A candidate for Congress must gather 1250 signatures. N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 6-136(2)(g) 
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Supporters of Pidot’s opponent challenged the validity of Pidot’s 
designating petition by alleging that he had not gathered the required number 
of signatures.4  The Board of Elections determined that Pidot had only 1234 
valid signatures—sixteen signatures shy of the minimum number required to 
be listed on the ballot.5 
Pidot, in accordance with New York State election law,6 initiated a 
proceeding in the New York State Supreme Court to challenge the Board’s 
determination and have his designating petition validated.7  Eventually, on 
June 23, 2016, five days before the scheduled primary, a New York court 
determined Pidot had, in fact, gathered the requisite number of signatures.8  
However, since the primary election was scheduled for a mere five days after 
the court’s decision, the court held that it would be “impossible” to place 
Pidot’s name on the primary ballot.9 
The court based its finding of impossibility on two grounds.  First, 
commissioners for county boards of election submitted affidavits to the court 
stating that there was not enough time to add Pidot’s name to the ballot ahead 
of the scheduled June 28 primary.10  Second, compliance with the Uniformed 
and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act11 (UOCAVA), which mandates 
that uniformed services and overseas voters have at least forty-five days to 
send in absentee ballots, would not be possible because the ballots sent to 
these voters were already printed and sent without Pidot’s name.12 
Conceding during oral arguments that it was too late to list Pidot’s name 
on the June 28 primary ballot, Pidot’s trial counsel requested that the court 
reschedule the primary.13  The Supreme Court held that it lacked authority to 
provide such relief and denied Pidot’s request.14  A New York appellate court 
affirmed the lower court’s ruling.15  It held that Pidot’s trial counsel had 
improperly requested that the court schedule a new primary at the conclusion 
of the trial.16 
 
(McKinney 2017).  In accordance with New York law, Pidot’s petition was deemed 
presumptively valid. Id. § 6-154. 
 4. Complaint, supra note 1, para. 24. 
 5. Id. para. 25. 
 6. ELEC. § 16-102(1). 
 7. Complaint, supra note 1, para. 27. 
 8. Id. paras. 1, 36. 
 9. See id. para. 1. 
 10. See id. para. 37. 
 11. 52 U.S.C. § 20302(a)(8) (2012).  Importantly, UOCAVA contains a “hardship 
exemption” that requires state election officials to request a waiver if the state is unable to 
meet the forty-five-day requirement for a variety of reasons, including “a delay in generating 
ballots due to a legal contest.” Id. § 20302(g)(2)(B)(ii).  Despite Pidot’s ongoing legal battle, 
the Board never requested a UOCAVA waiver. Complaint, supra note 1, para. 33.  
 12. Complaint, supra note 1, para. 2. 
 13. Pidot v. Macedo, 36 N.Y.S.3d 188, 189 (App. Div. 2016). 
 14. Id. at 190. 
 15. See id. at 189. 
 16. Id. 
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Despite a finding that Pidot did have enough signatures and should be on 
the ballot for the Republican primary, the appellate division held that there 
was nothing it could do to grant meaningful relief to Pidot.17 
Pidot’s run through the New York State court system came to an end, and 
voters were never given the opportunity to choose between two qualified 
candidates in the scheduled Republican primary.18  As a result, Jack Martins 
was deemed the candidate for the Republican Party in the third congressional 
district without a single ballot being cast.19 
Pidot and two voters then petitioned the New York State Board of 
Elections in the Northern District of New York to schedule a new primary.20  
Pidot alleged four claims for relief:  (1) UOCAVA was unconstitutional as 
applied because it constrained the court’s power to schedule a new primary 
election, (2) the New York State Board of Elections violated Pidot’s rights 
by failing to apply for an exemption, (3) voters’ First Amendment rights were 
violated when the primary election was not held, and (4) voters’ Fourteenth 
Amendment equal protection rights were violated by the cancellation of the 
primary.21  The plaintiffs argued the constitutional deprivation was caused 
by the state’s failure to apply for a UOCAVA waiver or hold a primary once 
the New York trial court determined that Pidot had gathered the required 
number of signatures to appear on the ballot.22 
Oral arguments were held in front of Judge Frederick J. Scullin Jr. on 
August 17, 2016.23  At the conclusion of the arguments, Judge Scullin ruled 
from the bench that the State Board of Elections was “obligated” to seek a 
hardship exemption under UOCAVA and that the defendants “violated the 
plaintiffs’ rights to a political association under the First Amendment to the 
United States Constitution, resulting in depriving the plaintiff Pidot and 
plaintiffs’ voters rights in the election.”24  The court ordered the Board of 
Elections to place Pidot on the ballot and scheduled a primary for October 6, 
2016.25 
Martins appealed the decision, and, on September 16, 2016, the Second 
Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and dismissed the case from the 
bench.26  In a two-page summary order, the Second Circuit held that the 
 
 17. See id. at 190. 
 18. Complaint, supra note 1, para. 39.  According to New York election law, when a 
primary has only one candidate, there is no actual vote and that candidate is deemed 
nominated. N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 6-160(2) (McKinney 2017); see also Ryan Brady, Tom Suozzi 
Wins Democratic Primary, QUEENS CHRON. (June 30, 2016, 10:30 AM), 
http://www.qchron.com/article_341fc128-3c22-580d-8493-41347d249702.html 
[https://perma.cc/V2YK-G6JH]. 
 19. Complaint, supra note 1, para. 39. 
 20. See id. para. 1. 
 21. See id. paras. 47–69. 
 22. See Answer Brief of Appellee-Plaintiffs at 15, Martins v. Pidot, 663 F. App’x 14 (2d 
Cir. 2016) (No. 16-3028-cv). 
 23. Transcript of Motion Hearing Decision at 1, Pidot v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, No. 
16-cv-859 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2016). 
 24. Id. at 4. 
 25. Id. 
 26. See Martins v. Pidot, 663 F. App’x 14, 17–18 (2d Cir. 2016). 
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plaintiffs’ federal claims were foreclosed by the Rivera-Powell doctrine.27  
The Rivera-Powell doctrine holds that when a candidate challenges his 
removal from the ballot “there is no independent burden on First Amendment 
rights when the state provides adequate procedures by which to remedy the 
alleged illegality.”28 
More than five months after Pidot first submitted his valid designating 
petition to the New York State Board of Elections, he lost his legal battle, 
and the 152,879 enrolled Republican voters in New York’s third 
congressional district lost the right to choose among two statutorily qualified 
candidates to represent them in the general election. 
Pidot’s long legal battle is not unique, as election litigation has 
dramatically increased since the 2000 election in which the Supreme Court 
intervened in Bush v. Gore.29  Judges asked to resolve election disputes often 
become immersed in a partisan battle that forces them to side with one 
candidate over another.  There is a risk that the public will perceive this 
judicial intervention as a partisan act motivated by loyalty to one party as 
opposed to an impartial application of the law.30  Moreover, there is little 
clarity or consistency when it comes to how federal courts resolve election 
disputes, partly because there is no established test that these courts apply.31 
Through the lens of Pidot, this Note examines the federal courts’ unsettled 
jurisprudence regarding when federal intervention in “candidate-litigated” 
election disputes is warranted.32  Part I provides background on the 
administration of elections and examines the process through which a party 
can bring a lawsuit challenging some aspect of the election administration in 
state or federal court.  Part II explores federal courts’ reluctance to intervene 
in election-related litigation to avoid the risk of appearing to be partisan 
actors.  In fact, legal scholars have demonstrated at both the state and federal 
level that a judge’s political ideology is often a good predictor of how the 
court resolves a dispute.  Finally, Part III examines Pidot to determine 
whether judicial nonintervention was appropriate in this instance and then 
 
 27. See id. at 17 (“[W]e can construe Pidot’s First Amendment claim in this case as 
analogous to a due process claim, as was done in Rivera-Powell itself.”). 
 28. Rivera-Powell v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Elections, 470 F.3d 458, 469 (2d Cir. 2006).  For a 
more extensive discussion of the Second Circuit’s application of the Rivera-Powell doctrine 
in Pidot, see infra Part I.C. 
 29. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).  In the year 2000 there were 197 election challenges, in 2004 there 
were 361, in 2008 there were 297, and in 2012 there were 298. See Rick Hasen, Election 
Litigation Rates Remain High, More Than Double the Period Before Bush v. Gore, ELECTION 
L. BLOG (Jan. 7, 2013, 7:55 AM), https://electionlawblog.org/?p=45951 
[https://perma.cc/55HU-297P]. 
 30. See Steven F. Huefner, Remedying Election Wrongs, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 265, 288 
(2007); see also infra Part II.B. 
 31. See infra Part I.B. 
 32. The term “candidate-driven election litigation” encompasses a subset of election 
litigation in which candidates raise legal disputes involving arcane questions of the law, 
including the counting of ballots, the eligibility of a candidate to run, whether a candidate is a 
resident in a particular jurisdiction, or whether a candidate can appear on a ballot despite 
technical defects in an application. See Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, The Long 
Shadow of Bush v. Gore:  Judicial Partisanship in Election Cases, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1411, 
1415–16 (2016). 
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proposes a clear judicial review standard that federal courts can use for 
similar cases.  This Note rejects the view that nonintervention should be the 
federal courts’ default position and, instead, proposes that the appearance of 
nonpartisanship should be a guiding force when courts determine whether to 
intervene in election disputes. 
I.  AN OVERVIEW OF ELECTION LITIGATION 
The Constitution protects American citizens’ right to vote, and, indeed, 
“[n]o right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in 
the election of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we 
must live.”33  Part I.A examines the constitutional foundation of the right to 
vote.  Part I.B explores how a candidate or voter who alleges his right to vote 
was infringed can bring a lawsuit in state or federal court.  Part I.C explains 
the Second Circuit’s reliance on the Rivera-Powell doctrine in Pidot. 
A.  The First Amendment Right to Vote 
The ability to freely associate to advance shared beliefs is “a basic 
component of any democratic polis.”34  If citizens do not have the ability to 
freely associate with other like-minded citizens to advance common ideas, 
effective participation in a democracy is impossible.35  Other rights secured 
by the First Amendment—speech, assembly, religion, petition—would be of 
no value if the Constitution did not protect the right to associate.36 
The drafters of the Constitution purposefully chose not to address voting 
rights explicitly because universal suffrage laws would have complicated an 
already fraught relationship between states and the newly forming federal 
government.37  Nonetheless, the Court has established that there is a 
constitutionally protected right to vote contained within the First 
Amendment’s right to freely associate.38  From the nation’s earliest days, the 
Court recognized that the Constitution protects the right, of those qualified, 
to vote.39  As early as 1886 in Yick Wo v. Hopkins,40 the Court found that the 
 
 33. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964). 
 34. Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Racial Identity, Electoral Structures, and the First Amendment 
Right of Association, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1209, 1239 (2003). 
 35. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15 (1976) (“The First Amendment protects political 
association as well as political expression.”). 
 36. See David Cole, Hanging with the Wrong Crowd:  Of Gangs, Terrorists, and the Right 
of Association, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 203, 203. 
 37. VICTORIA BASETTI, ELECTORAL DYSFUNCTION:  A SURVIVAL MANUAL FOR AMERICAN 
VOTERS 5 (2012). 
 38. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968) (“We have repeatedly held that freedom 
of association is protected by the First Amendment.”); see also Buckley, 424 U.S. at 15 (noting 
that freedom of association protects “the right to associate with the political party of one’s 
choice” (quoting Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 56 (1973))); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 
533, 554 (1964) (“Undeniably the Constitution of the United States protects the right of all 
qualified citizens to vote”); Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 17. 
 39. Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 656–57 (1884). 
 40. 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
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right to vote was fundamental despite the lack of an explicit mention of such 
a right in the Constitution.41 
Restrictions on one’s right to vote “strike at the heart of representative 
government.”42  The right can neither be denied outright nor destroyed by 
alteration or dilution of one’s vote.43  The protection against federal 
encroachment of this right has been extended to infringement by the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment.44 
This right to vote encompasses two distinct but overlapping rights:  “the 
right of individuals to associate for the advancement of [their] political 
beliefs, and the right of qualified voters, regardless of their political 
persuasion, to cast their votes effectively.”45  While the Constitution protects 
the right to vote, election administration has always been a matter of state 
control.46 
1.  Elections Are State Run 
The Constitution explicitly mandates that states regulate “[t]he Times, 
Places and Manner of holding Elections.”47  States control the administration 
of elections with little federal oversight.48  Congress has enacted only limited 
legislation that regulates specific aspects of election administration.49  
Generally, however, states’ election codes govern the specifics of election 
administration from the voter registration process, to ballot access 
requirements for candidates, to the voting process itself.50  While these 
regulations are necessary to ensure fair elections, they inevitably impose 
some restrictions on an individual’s First Amendment right to vote.51  Courts 
 
 41. Id. at 370. 
 42. Reynolds, 377 U.S at 555. 
 43. See id. at 554–55. 
 44. See Williams, 393 U.S at 30–31. 
 45. Id. at 30. 
 46. Daniel P. Tokaji, Public Rights and Private Rights of Action:  The Enforcement of 
Federal Election Laws, 44 IND. L. REV. 113, 117 (2010). 
 47. U.S. CONST. art I, § 4 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for 
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but 
the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places 
of chusing Senators.”).  
 48. See Gamza v. Aguirre, 619 F.2d 449, 453 (5th Cir. 1980) (“[T]he Framers of the 
Constitution intended the States to keep for themselves, as provided in the Tenth Amendment, 
the power to regulate elections.” (citing Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 124–25 (1970))); 
see also Oden v. Brittain, 396 U.S. 1210, 1211 (1969) (“I remain firmly convinced that the 
Constitution forbids this unwarranted and discriminatory intervention by the Federal 
Government in state and local affairs.”). 
 49. See, e.g., Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 36 and 52 U.S.C.); National Voter Registration 
Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-31, 107 Stat. 77 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 39 
and 52 U.S.C.); Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, Pub. L. No. 99-410, 
100 Stat. 924 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 52 U.S.C.); Voting 
Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 52 U.S.C.). 
 50. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983). 
 51. See id. at 788–89.  The Court stated that restrictions on the right to vote trigger the 
“‘fundamental rights’ strand of equal protection analysis.” Id. at 786 n.7.  But see generally 
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have recognized, however, that some state-imposed burdens are necessary if 
elections are to be “fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than 
chaos, is to accompany the democratic process[].”52  To accomplish the goal 
of fair and honest elections, states have enacted complex election laws that 
control all aspects of the election process.53 
These state election statutes also dictate how a candidate or voter can 
initiate a lawsuit alleging an injury resulting from some aspect of the state’s 
administration of the electoral process.  There is little uniformity among 
states regarding how election-related disputes are reviewed by the courts.54  
Different review mechanisms include decisions by state trial courts, state 
supreme courts,55  state legislatures, or neutral tribunals.56  Often, the review 
procedure depends on what type of election is being contested.57 
The electoral process encompasses many distinct stages, including ballot 
access, primary contests, and general elections.58  Litigation may arise at each 
step in the electoral process involving both pre- and post-election disputes.  
Pidot presents an example of preelection litigation because the legal 
challenge concerned a candidate’s right to be on the primary ballot. 
2.  Ballot-Access Statutes 
Ballot-access statutes establish requirements that candidates must meet 
before they can be listed on ballots.  A state has an interest in ensuring that 
candidates who earn a spot on a ballot have some minimum level of support 
among voters.59  Restrictions on a candidate’s ability to access the ballot 
inevitably affect a voter’s right to support a candidate who shares his or her 
beliefs.60  While states can impose ballot-access restrictions, “substantial 
 
Joshua A. Douglas, Is the Right to Vote Really Fundamental?, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
143 (2008) (arguing that although the right to vote is considered fundamental, courts do not 
consistently apply strict scrutiny review in such cases). 
 52. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788. 
 53. See, e.g., N.Y. ELEC. LAW §§ 6-100 to 6-136 (McKinney 2017). 
 54. Joshua A. Douglas, Procedural Fairness in Election Contests, 88 IND. L.J. 1, 3 (2013). 
 55. In New York, the Supreme Court is the trial level court. Welcome Message, N.Y. ST. 
UNIFED CT. SYS., http://www.nycourts.gov/courts/1jd/supctmanh/ [https://perma.cc/CRU5-
57D6] (last visited Nov. 19, 2017). 
 56. See Douglas, supra note 54, at 9–24. 
 57. See id. at 5. 
 58. Louise Weinberg, When Courts Decide Elections:  The Constitutionality of Bush v. 
Gore, 82 B.U. L. REV. 609, 620 (2002). 
 59. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 n.9 (1983); see also Jenness v. Fortson, 
403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971) (holding that a state can require a candidate to demonstrate that he 
has a “significant modicum of support” before printing his name on a ballot). 
 60. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972) (“[T]he rights of voters and the rights of 
candidates do not lend themselves to neat separation; laws that affect candidates always have 
at least some theoretical, correlative effect on voters.”).  Courts have maintained that a voter’s 
interest in having a candidate he or she supports on the ballot is connected to, but independent 
from, the candidate’s interest in being on the ballot. See Schulz v. Williams, 44 F.3d 48, 54 
(2d Cir. 1994); see also Tarpley v. Salerno, 803 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that 
plaintiff-voters can sue in federal court because, although voters have some common interest 
with the candidate, “the relationship is not close enough to be viewed as an authorization by 
the former to the latter to represent the voters in the legal proceedings in the state courts”). 
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burdens” are suspect and trigger potential First and Fourteenth Amendment 
violations.61 
3.  New York’s Ballot-Access Statutes 
New York ballot-access requirements are “infamous for stringently 
enforcing arcane petition requirements.”62  Indeed, in 2000, a federal district 
court found that New York’s ballot-access scheme for primary elections 
posed an undue burden on the constitutionally protected First Amendment 
right to vote.63  Article 6 of New York’s election law provides the procedure 
by which candidates can obtain access to the ballot in New York.64 
To get on the ballot, most candidates must submit a designating petition.65  
The designating petition contains specific information about the candidate 
and requires the candidate to gather a certain number of signatures.66  While 
filed petitions are presumptively valid, any voter qualified to vote for the 
candidate designated can object to the validity of the petition.67  Once an 
objection has been filed, the Board of Elections must determine whether the 
petition meets all statutory requirements.68  After the Board makes this 
determination, an aggrieved candidate, the chairman of a party committee, or 
the person who initially filed the objection to the petition can challenge the 
Board’s decision in state court.69 
While article 6 establishes ballot-access requirements, article 16 provides 
that a party can challenge some aspect of the administration of an election in 
state court.70  Section 16-100 states, “The supreme court is vested with 
jurisdiction to summarily determine any question of law or fact arising as to 
any subject set forth in this article, which shall be construed liberally.”71  This 
broad legislative mandate gives the New York trial courts power to ensure 
that voters have the opportunity to fully exercise their right to vote.72  Other 
sections in article 16 provide specific causes of action that a candidate or 
voter can bring in court and give judges some guidance on the appropriate 
 
 61. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 729 (1974). 
 62. Robert Yablon, Validation Procedures and the Burden of Ballot Access Regulations, 
115 YALE L.J. 1833, 1837 (2006).  See generally JERRY H. GOLDFEDER, GOLDFEDER’S 
MODERN ELECTION LAW (3rd ed. 2012) (describing New York’s ballot-access procedures). 
 63. Molinari v. Powers, 82 F. Supp. 2d 57, 71 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).  The court in Molinari 
singled out two specific provisions of New York’s ballot-access scheme that pose an 
unconstitutional burden on candidates’ ability to get on ballots. Id. 
 64. N.Y. ELEC. LAW §§ 6-100 to 6-136 (McKinney 2017). 
 65. Id. §§ 6-118 to 6-122. 
 66. Id. §§ 6-130 to 6-134 (statutory requirements); id. § 6-136 (number of signatures). 
 67. Id. § 6-154(2). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. § 16-102(1).  The statute does not permit the designation of a candidate to be 
challenged by other parties. See id.  Pidot presents a situation in which a voter cannot initiate 
a proceeding to challenge the Board’s determination that a designating petition was invalid 
under § 16-102(1). 
 70. Id. §§ 16-100 to 16-120. 
 71. Id. § 16-100(1). 
 72. Eve v. Mahoney, 358 N.Y.S.2d 785, 786 (App. Div. 1974) (recognizing “the broad 
powers granted to the Supreme Court to make such orders as fairness and justice require in 
election cases”). 
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remedy.73  Through the election laws, the state legislature establishes when 
a court should resolve an election dispute.74 
Pidot initiated his proceeding under section 16-102, which allows an 
aggrieved candidate to challenge the Board’s determination that a 
designating petition was deficient.75  Under that section, if the court 
determines that there has been “such fraud or irregularity as to render 
impossible a determination as to who rightfully was nominated or elected,” 
the court can order a new primary election to be held.76 
Pidot argued that the state’s failure to hold a primary election, despite two 
qualified candidates earning a spot on the ballot, was the very sort of 
irregularity section 16-102 was meant to address.77  While the state court 
agreed that Pidot had a valid claim under section 16-102, the court held that 
it did not have the power to reschedule the primary election.78  In other words, 
despite the broad authority granted to the court under section 16-102, the 
court held that it was powerless to act to remedy the Board’s erroneous 
determination that Pidot’s designating petition was defective. 
B.  Bringing an Election-Related Claim in Federal Court 
While election disputes typically begin in state court under the relevant 
state statutory provisions, alleged constitutional deprivations arising from the 
maladministration of an election can also be brought in federal court.79  For 
much of the early part of American history, however, federal courts were 
hesitant to intervene to protect voting rights.80  As a general rule, federal 
court intervention in state-run election matters is not appropriate because 
such intervention raises federalism concerns.81  Early courts maintained that 
only the legislature, not the courts, could act to limit discrimination in voting 
rights cases.82  The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence through much of the first 
half of the twentieth century reveals a desire to avoid resolving election cases 
in which judges are forced to pick sides in a partisan dispute.83  This refusal 
 
 73. ELEC. §§ 16-100 to 16-120. 
 74. Ashline v. Haley, 219 N.Y.S.2d 911, 912 (Sup. Ct. 1961). 
 75. ELEC. § 16-102. 
 76. Id. § 16-102(3). 
 77. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 14, Pidot v. Macedo, 36 N.Y.S.3d 188 (App. Div. July 
21, 2016) (No. 2016-6927). 
 78. Pidot, 36 N.Y.S.3d at 189 (“[The trial court] granted that branch of Pidot’s petition 
which was to validate the designating petition but determined that it would be impossible to 
grant that branch of his petition which sought to place his name on the June 28, 2016, primary 
ballot.”). 
 79. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012). 
 80. See Rossito-Canty v. Cuomo, 86 F. Supp. 3d 175, 187 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 81. See Weinberg, supra note 58, at 654. 
 82. See United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 218 (1875) (holding that Congress may 
enforce by “appropriate legislation” the rights conferred by the Fifteenth Amendment). 
 83. See, e.g., Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 565 (1946) (finding congressional 
reapportionment to be nonjusticiable political question); Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 
282–84 (1937) (holding a poll tax to be constitutional under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments).  But see United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 323–24 (1941) (finding that 
Congress can regulate primary elections); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 540–41 (1927) 
(deeming unconstitutional a Texas statute that prevented an African American man from 
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to intervene in voting rights issues gave the states broad latitude to enforce 
various means of restricting access to the polls, including literacy tests, poll 
taxes, and “grandfather” clauses.84 
Partly due to the ratification of constitutional amendments that specifically 
protected voting rights,85 the middle of the twentieth century ushered in a 
new era in voting rights litigation.86  The federal courts pulled back from the 
insistence that voting rights policies were reserved for the states and actively 
enforced the right to vote.87 
Federal courts are now heavily involved in many aspects of election 
litigation.88  However, while federal courts often intervene in disputes 
regarding class-based discrimination or restrictive election laws, federal 
intervention is still rare in cases where constitutional deprivation is alleged 
as a result of a state’s application of a state law in a particular dispute.89  
These particular disputes are typically brought by a candidate and deal with 
arcane questions of law such as a candidate’s ballot eligibility or the counting 
of ballots after an election.90  While federal intervention in litigation in which 
a candidate challenges some particular aspect of the state’s administration of 
an election is rare, it is not unprecedented. 
1.  Federal Court Intervention in 
Candidate-Litigated Election Disputes 
Despite increased intervention to protect the right to vote, federal courts 
still rarely intervene in “candidate-litigated” election disputes.91  The federal 
judiciary has consistently held that it is not its job to resolve minor election 
 
voting in a primary election); Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 665 (1884) (holding that 
under the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress can pass legislation regulating the right to vote). 
 84. See Rossito-Canty, 86 F. Supp. 3d at 187; see also Classic, 313 U.S. at 311 (“[T]he 
states are given, and in fact exercise, a wide discretion in the formulation of a system for the 
choice by the people of representatives in Congress.”). 
 85. The Nineteenth Amendment, ratified in 1920, provided women with the right to vote. 
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.  The Twenty-Fourth Amendment, ratified in 1964, provided 
that the right to vote could not be conditioned on a poll tax. See id. amend. XXIV.  The Twenty-
Sixth Amendment, ratified in 1971, provided people over eighteen with the right to vote. See 
id. amend. XXVI. 
 86. Rossito-Canty, 86 F. Supp. 3d at 187–88. 
 87. See id. (collecting cases). 
 88. See Weinberg, supra note 58, at 622 (“It is clear enough . . . that courts can and do 
adjudicate election controversies.”); see also Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2623 
(2013) (“[T]he Federal Government retains significant control over federal elections.”). 
 89. Hutchinson v. Miller, 797 F.2d 1279, 1283 (4th Cir. 1986) (“We first acknowledge 
and affirm the significant duty of federal courts to preserve constitutional rights in the electoral 
process.  Our role, however, primarily addresses the general application of laws and 
procedures, not the particulars of election disputes.”).  Pidot presents this type of dispute since 
Pidot challenged the Board’s determination that he did not have enough signatures to be listed 
on the ballot. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 90. See Kang & Shepherd, supra note 32, at 1415.  Kang and Shepherd use the term 
“candidate-litigated election disputes” to describe these types of cases. Id. 
 91. See Griffin v. Burns, 570 F.2d 1065, 1076 (1st Cir. 1978) (“Federal court intervention 
into the state’s conduct of elections for reasons other than racial discrimination has tended, for 
the most part, to be limited to striking down state laws or rules of general application which 
improperly restrict or constrict the franchise.” (citations omitted)). 
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irregularities.92  The federal courts do not oversee the details of election 
administration and minor irregularities do not rise to the level of a 
constitutional violation.93  Irregularities are not uncommon in the 
administration of elections and, as the Second Circuit stated, “we cannot 
believe that the framers of our Constitution were so hypersensitive to 
ordinary human frailties as to lay down an unrealistic requirement that 
elections be free of any error.”94 
These minor irregularities are referred to as “garden-variety” disputes.95  
Examples of garden-variety disputes include 
malfunctioning of voting machines, human error resulting in miscounting 
of votes and delay in arrival of voting machines, allegedly inadequate state 
response to illegal cross-over voting, mechanical and human error in 
counting votes, technical deficiencies in printing ballots, mistakenly 
allowing non-party members to vote in a congressional primary, and 
arbitrary rejection of ten ballots.96 
These minor errors are an unfortunate reality of election administration,97 and 
federal courts have declined to hear cases even when the error disputed may 
have determined the outcome of the election.98 
The tendency against intervention is not absolute, however, and in rare 
instances the federal judiciary has stepped in to resolve disputes.99  A court’s 
job is “to separate wheat from chaff, and to determine whether [a particular 
dispute] fits into one of the isthmian exceptions to this general rule of non-
intervention.”100  The facts of each dispute must be considered before a court 
can determine if it is a run-of-the-mill electoral dispute or something more.101  
In determining whether intervention is appropriate, two factors that federal 
courts consistently examine is whether (1) the state corrective procedure was 
adequate and (2) the dispute would result in fundamental unfairness absent 
intervention.  These two factors will be examined in turn. 
2.  Adequacy of State Court Procedure 
Federal courts look to the adequacy of the due process afforded by the state 
procedure before determining if federal intervention is appropriate.102  If the 
state procedure is adequate, federal intervention is inappropriate. 
For example, in Powell v. Power,103 Powell, a candidate for Congress in 
New York’s eighteenth congressional district, petitioned a federal court to set 
 
 92. Powell v. Power, 436 F.2d 84, 86 (2d Cir. 1970). 
 93. Pettengill v. Putnam Cty. R-1 Sch. Dist., 472 F.2d 121, 122 (8th Cir. 1973). 
 94. Powell, 436 F.2d at 88. 
 95. Bennett v. Yoshina, 140 F.3d 1218, 1226 (9th Cir. 1998) (listing cases from various 
circuits all declining to intervene in election disputes). 
 96. Shannon v. Jacobowitz, 394 F.3d 90, 96 (2d Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). 
 97. Hutchinson v. Miller, 797 F.2d 1279, 1286 (4th Cir. 1986). 
 98. Bennett, 140 F.3d at 1226. 
 99. See Powell, 436 F.2d at 86. 
 100. Bonas v. Town of North Smithfield, 265 F.3d 69, 74 (1st Cir. 2001). 
 101. Id. at 75. 
 102. Gold v. Feinberg, 101 F.3d 796, 800 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 103. 436 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1970). 
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aside the results of a primary election citing irregularities in the voting 
process.104  Powell argued that ineligible voters had voted in the primary, 
which affected the outcome of the election.105  New York election law 
requires a candidate challenging the outcome of a primary election to initiate 
a lawsuit within ten days after the primary.106  Because Powell failed to 
comply with this statutory mandate, the state court dismissed his petition.107  
In denying Powell federal relief, the Second Circuit held that relief was 
unavailable if “an adequate and fair state remedy exists.”108  In other words, 
the federal court was powerless to act if the candidate failed to follow the 
appropriate state corrective procedures. 
In a later Second Circuit decision, the court again denied relief because the 
plaintiffs did not first bring a claim in New York state court despite the 
opportunity to do so.109  The court held that the plaintiff’s failure to pursue 
the appropriate state court remedy was fatal to his claim.110  The court was 
clear, however, that its unwillingness to intervene in the dispute “in no way 
disparages the constitutional right of voters to ‘cast their ballots and have 
them counted.’”111  Rather, where “there exists a state law remedy to the 
election irregularities that is fair and adequate, human error in the conduct of 
elections does not rise” to a constitutional violation.112 
Other circuit courts have similarly looked to the adequacy of the state 
corrective procedure to determine if federal court intervention is 
appropriate.113  The First Circuit in Griffin v. Burns114 determined that Rhode 
Island’s retroactive invalidation of absentee and shut-in ballots in a primary 
election was a violation of voters’ constitutionally protected right to vote.115  
In Griffin, a Democratic primary was held for a vacancy on the Providence 
City Council.116  Election officials told voters that they could vote using an 
absentee or shut-in ballot.117  After the primary election, one of the 
candidates challenged the use of absentee and shut-in ballots in primary 
elections, and the Rhode Island Supreme Court invalidated all votes that were 
 
 104. Id. at 85–86. 
 105. Id. at 86. 
 106. See id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. See Gold v. Feinberg, 101 F.3d 796, 800 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing Powell, 436 F.2d at 
88). 
 109. Id.  
 110. Id.  
 111. Id. at 802 (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 315 (1941)). 
 112. Id. 
 113. See, e.g., Gold, 101 F.3d at 802; Roe v. Alabama, 43 F.3d 574, 582 (11th Cir. 1995); 
Hutchinson v. Miller, 797 F.2d 1279, 1284 (4th Cir. 1986); Duncan v. Poythress, 657 F.2d 
691, 705–06 (5th Cir. 1981); Griffin v. Burns, 570 F.2d. 1065, 1077 (1st Cir. 1978); Hennings 
v. Grafton, 523 F.2d 861, 865 (7th Cir. 1975); Pettengill v. Putnam Cty. R-1 Sch. Dist., 472 
F.2d 121, 122–23 (8th Cir. 1973). 
 114. 570 F.2d. 1065 (1st Cir. 1978). 
 115. See id. at 1078–79. 
 116. Id. at 1066. 
 117. Id. at 1067. 
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not cast in person.118  When Rhode Island voters alleged that the state court’s 
decision resulted in a First Amendment violation of their right to vote, the 
First Circuit decided that intervention was appropriate.119  It held that the 
voters’ allegation went beyond a typical garden-variety dispute and that the 
voters had no way to challenge the election officials’ actions other than in 
federal court.120  The court based its decision to intervene on the inadequacy 
of existing state corrective procedures and the inadequacy of existing state 
procedures.121 
The Eleventh Circuit, in Roe v. Alabama,122 also looked to the available 
state court remedy before determining federal court intervention to be 
appropriate in a candidate-litigated election dispute.123  In Roe, the 
established procedures for voting via absentee ballot were changed by an 
Alabama court after the election had already been held.124  The Eleventh 
Circuit held that the established state procedure for resolving this dispute—a 
legislative contest—was not an adequate forum for the constitutional issues 
presented by the legislation.125 
3.  Fundamental Unfairness 
The Griffin court and the Roe court both determined that the state 
corrective procedure in place was inadequate, and further, that 
nonintervention would result in fundamental unfairness to the voters.  In 
Griffin, the court held that the state election officials had induced voters to 
vote by absentee or shut-in ballot, thus stripping them of their vote in the 
primary.126  While acknowledging the preference for nonintervention, the 
court maintained that when the “election process itself reaches the point of 
patent and fundamental unfairness,” a constitutional violation is afoot and 
judicial intervention is necessary to protect constitutionally guaranteed 
rights.127 
Similarly, in Roe, the court found that the retroactive change in absentee 
ballot procedures affected the “fundamental fairness” of the election.128  The 
change resulted in vote dilution for some voters and disenfranchisement for 
others who may have voted via absentee ballot had the requirements been 
less stringent.129  In both Griffin and Roe, the courts engaged in a fact-
 
 118. Id. at 1068.  Absentee and shut-in ballots constituted nearly 10 percent of the total 
primary vote. Id. at 1074.  Voters who lived close to their polling location but were unable to 
secure transportation to the polls used shut-in ballots. Id. at 1067. 
 119. Id. at 1077–78. 
 120. Id. at 1079 (“[T]he federal court was the only practical forum for redress:  there 
appears to have been no standard state procedure for handling a claim such as this . . . .”). 
 121. Id. at 1077. 
 122. 43 F.3d 574 (11th Cir. 1995). 
 123. Id. at 582. 
 124. See id. at 579. 
 125. See id. at 582. 
 126. Griffin, 570 F.2d at 1074. 
 127. Id. at 1077.  The Griffin court provided § 1983 relief. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
(2012). 
 128. Roe, 43 F.3d at 581. 
 129. See id. 
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intensive inquiry into the conduct of the election to determine whether the 
state’s administration of the election was simply a garden-variety dispute or 
resulted in fundamental unfairness to the voters.130 
A federal court’s job is to draw a distinction between a garden-variety 
irregularity and a “pervasive error that undermines the integrity of the 
vote.”131  Griffin and Roe, like Pidot, were candidate-driven election disputes 
in which a candidate challenged some aspect of the state’s administration and 
application of state law.  While no federal court has established a formal test 
with explicit factors to determine when intervention is appropriate, the 
adequacy of the state corrective procedure and whether nonintervention 
would result in fundamental unfairness are two important considerations for 
many courts. 
C.  The Second Circuit’s Reliance on Rivera-Powell 
After Judge Scullin in the Northern District of New York rescheduled the 
Republican primary for October 6, 2016, and ordered both Pidot and Martins 
to be listed on the ballot,132 the Second Circuit reversed the district court’s 
decision relying on the Rivera-Powell doctrine.133 
The Rivera-Powell doctrine stems from a case in which Verena Rivera-
Powell, a candidate for judge of the Civil Court of the City of New York, 
sued the city’s Board of Elections for wrongfully removing her from the 
ballot.134  After a voter challenged the number of signatures on Rivera-
Powell’s designating petition, the Board determined that she did not have 
enough signatures and removed her from the ballot.135  Rivera-Powell 
challenged the timeliness of the voter’s objection in a New York trial court, 
but the court dismissed her complaint for lack of jurisdiction.136  Rather than 
appealing the dismissal, Rivera-Powell, along with plaintiff-voters, brought 
suit in federal court alleging First and Fourteenth Amendment violations.137 
In an opinion by then-circuit Judge Sonia Sotomayor, the Second Circuit 
rejected Rivera-Powell’s Fourteenth Amendment claim and held that the 
procedures in place both before and after Rivera-Powell’s name was removed 
from the ballot satisfied the state’s due process burden, and therefore there 
 
 130. Other circuits have also looked to the see if the state action has resulted in fundamental 
unfairness to the voters. See, e.g., Gold v. Feinberg, 101 F.3d 796, 801 (2d Cir. 1996) (invoking 
Griffin and holding federal intervention to be unwarranted absent “broad-gauged unfairness”); 
Duncan v. Poythress, 657 F.2d 691, 702 (5th Cir. 1981) (stating that federal court intervention 
may be appropriate when “state actions have jeopardized the integrity of the electoral 
process”). 
 131. Bennett v. Yoshina, 140 F.3d 1218, 1226 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 132. Pidot v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, No. 16-cv-859, slip op. at 4 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 
2016). 
 133. See Martins v. Pidot, 663 F. App’x 14, 17 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 134. Rivera-Powell v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Elections, 470 F.3d 458, 461–62 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 135. Id. at 463. 
 136. See id. at 464.  Rivera-Powell’s complaint was not verified, as required by New York 
election law. Id. 
 137. See id. 
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was no independent First Amendment violation.138  Before Rivera-Powell’s 
name was removed from the ballot, she had a predeprivation hearing before 
the Board of Elections where she had an opportunity to voice opposition to 
the removal.139  After her removal, she had the opportunity to challenge the 
decision in state court and to obtain full judicial review of the Board’s 
determination in accordance with New York law.140 
Regarding Rivera-Powell’s First Amendment claim, the Second Circuit 
found that it was “virtually indistinguishable from her due process claim, in 
that she allege[d] no additional deprivation of her First Amendment interests 
independent from the deprivation that form[ed] the basis of her due process 
claim.”141  Rivera-Powell did not argue that the Board’s review process was 
unconstitutional or statutorily invalid.  Rather, she argued that in this 
particular instance, the Board simply erred in sustaining a challenge to the 
validity of her designating petition.142  The Second Circuit held that Rivera-
Powell did not follow the state’s procedure for bringing a claim and, 
therefore, federal judicial intervention was not warranted.143  The state 
corrective procedure provided adequate due process and a federal court 
should not review a potential constitutional violation simply because the 
candidate failed to follow the established state procedure.144 
The Second Circuit summarized its holding this way:  “when a candidate 
raises a First Amendment challenge to his or her removal from the ballot 
based on the allegedly unauthorized application of an admittedly valid 
restriction, the state has satisfied the First Amendment if it has provided due 
process.”145 
The Rivera-Powell doctrine has been applied by courts within the Second 
Circuit to election cases when a candidate (or a voter who supports a 
candidate) tries to raise a due process violation in federal court.146  Cases 
citing the Rivera-Powell doctrine to dismiss a candidate’s claim typically 
 
 138. Id. at 466–68.  The trial court held, “having found no violation of state law, there are 
no viable federal claims to support federal jurisdiction, and therefore the complaint is 
dismissed.” Rivera-Powell v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Elections, No. 06 CIV. 6843 (NRB), 2006 WL 
2850212, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4), aff’d, 470 F.3d 458 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 139. Rivera-Powell, 470 F.3d at 466. 
 140. Id. at 467.  The court found that its due process analysis was not affected by Rivera-
Powell’s failure to properly pursue action in state court. Id. at 467 n.9.  Additionally, she could 
have appealed the dismissal of her petition but decided not to. Id. 
 141. Id. at 468.  The Second Circuit held that Rivera-Powell’s “First Amendment claim is 
inextricably intertwined with the question of whether the state afforded her procedurally 
adequate process.” Id. at 469. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 468–69. 
 144. Id. at 469–70. 
 145. Id.  
 146. See, e.g., Tiraco v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, 963 F. Supp. 2d 184, 194–95 
(E.D.N.Y. 2013); Thomas v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Elections, 898 F. Supp. 2d 594, 599 (S.D.N.Y. 
2012); McMillan v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, No. 10-CV-2502, 2010 WL 4065434, at *8, 
*10 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2010), aff’d, 449 F. App’x 79 (2d Cir. 2011); see also Appellant’s 
Emergency Opening Brief at 32 n.5, Martins v. Pidot, 663 F. App’x 14 (2d Cir. 2016) (No. 
16-3028), 2016 WL 4662237, at *32 n.5 (listing fourteen ballot-access cases that have invoked 
the Rivera-Powell doctrine). 
2017] A VOTE FOR CLARITY 1377 
involve First Amendment and due process claims.  These claims come to the 
federal courts after dismissal or adjudication against the candidate in state 
court.147  Courts have held that voters alleging a constitutional violation in 
federal court have no valid claim if the candidate lost a due process challenge 
in state court or failed to pursue the appropriate postdeprivation remedy.148 
In Pidot, the Second Circuit held that Pidot’s First Amendment claim was 
“analogous to a due process claim” and therefore the dispute was not 
appropriate for federal court intervention.149  Until Pidot, the Rivera-Powell 
doctrine had never been applied in a case where the candidate won in state 
court and the candidate alleged no due process violation.  Additionally, the 
doctrine was never applied to bar voters from bringing a claim in federal court 
when those voters had no standing to bring the same claim in state court.  
Thus, voters who were statutorily barred from New York state election 
proceedings were prohibited from asserting their rights in federal court.150  
As such, the Second Circuit in Pidot extended the Rivera-Powell doctrine 
beyond the context and holding of the Rivera-Powell decision. 
II.  THE APPEARANCE OF PARTISANSHIP IN ELECTION LITIGATION 
Every judge must take an oath to execute his or her duties faithfully and 
impartially.151  When resolving election disputes, the risk of appearing 
impartial is particularly great since resolution inherently involves siding with 
one candidate over another.152  Election cases put judges in the position of 
“kingmaker” and requires them to choose a winner and a loser in an election 
dispute.153  Even if a judge determines the outcome of an election-related 
dispute fairly, the public might view the court as a partisan actor affecting the 
 
 147. See Tiraco, 963 F. Supp. 2d at 194 (“[T]he City Board’s alleged actions here did not 
violate fundamental due process principles because Plaintiff was provided adequate 
process.”); Marchant v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Elections, 815 F. Supp. 2d 568, 579 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) 
(“[The candidate] has been afforded the very same pre-deprivation hearing from the Board 
and judicial review in state court that the Second Circuit reviewed and deemed adequate in 
Rivera-Powell . . . .”); Minnus v. Bd. of Elections, No. 10-cv-3918, 2010 WL 3528544, at *4 
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2010) (“[New York election law] provides ample opportunity and notice 
both to be heard prior determining [sic] a petition’s validity and to challenge the Board’s 
determinations.  [The candidate] was not deprived of an opportunity to be heard, rather she 
chose not to avail herself of the process . . . .”). 
 148. See Thomas, 898 F. Supp. 2d at 599 (“Because the candidate plaintiffs here support 
had a full and fair opportunity to litigate this issue in state court, plaintiffs have failed to 
allege—much less prove—that they were deprived of any constitutional right.”). 
 149. See Pidot, 663 F. App’x at 17. 
 150. See supra note 69 (stating who has standing to sue).  Only aggrieved candidates or 
objectors have standing under section 16-102(1) of New York election law. N.Y. ELEC. LAW 
§§ 16-102(1) (McKinney 2017). 
 151. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 453 (2012) (federal); N.Y. CONST. art. XIII, § 1 (state). 
 152. Richard L. Hasen, Beyond the Margin of Litigation:  Reforming U.S. Election 
Administration to Avoid Electoral Meltdown, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 937, 993 (2005) 
(“Putting judges in the position of deciding election law questions when the winner and loser 
of its decision will be obvious can undermine the legitimacy of the courts.”). 
 153. See Huefner, supra note 30, at 306; see also Douglas, supra note 54, at 3 (“State 
legislatures recognize that cases involving election contests are different from normal legal 
disputes.  A decision maker must determine the winner of an election.”). 
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declared winner’s legitimacy.154  Part II.A presents the “political thicket” as 
a justification for why courts are hesitant to intervene in election-related 
disputes.  Next, Part II.B examines the courts’ current role in the election-
litigation arena and provides evidence that judges are influenced by party 
loyalty.  Part II.C then discusses state laws that give judges guidance on how 
to determine the appropriate remedy in election disputes. 
A.  The “Political Thicket” 
Two mid-twentieth century reapportionment cases decided just sixteen 
years apart—Colegrove v. Green155 and Baker v. Carr156—demonstrate the 
federal courts’ reluctance to involve themselves in political matters.  When 
determining whether to intervene in these disputes, the U.S. Supreme Court 
grapples with two big questions.  First, is intervention in reapportionment 
disputes—an area traditionally reserved for state legislatures—
constitutionally permissible?157  And second, if the Court gets entangled in 
the “political thicket,” how could the Court ever leave that realm?158  While 
the “political thicket” term is tied to reapportionment jurisprudence, this Note 
argues that these same concerns are relevant in all aspects of election-related 
litigation. 
1.  Colegrove v. Green 
In Colegrove, Illinois voters alleged a Fourteenth Amendment equal 
protection violation because some Illinois congressional districts had much 
larger populations than others.159  Justice Felix Frankfurter, writing for the 
majority, concluded that “the Constitution has conferred upon Congress 
exclusive authority to secure fair representation by the States . . . .  If 
Congress failed in exercising its powers, whereby standards of fairness are 
offended, the remedy ultimately lies with the people.”160  The majority held 
that whether the Illinois districting scheme was unfair was a political question 
and therefore nonjusticiable.161  Justice Frankfurter saw issues related to 
 
 154. See Douglas, supra note 54, at 51. 
 155. 328 U.S. 549 (1946). 
 156. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 157. See Grant M. Hayden, The Supreme Court and Voting Rights:  A More Complete Exit 
Strategy, 83 N.C. L. REV. 949, 969 (2005).  As of this writing, the Supreme Court is 
considering whether the courts should be involved in “partisan gerrymandering.” See Jess 
Bravin & Brent Kendall, Supreme Court Appears Divided over Gerrymandering, WALL ST. J. 
(Oct. 3, 2017, 5:44 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/supreme-court-takes-on-the-partisan-
gerrymander-1507023002 [https://perma.cc/A6GE-4TCE]. 
 158. See Hayden, supra note 157, at 969.  
 159. Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 550. 
 160. Id. at 554.  
 161. See id. at 556 (“The Constitution has many commands that are not enforceable by 
courts because they clearly fall outside the conditions and purposes that circumscribe judicial 
action.”).  But see Comment, Challenges to Congressional Districting:  After Baker v. Carr 
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reapportionment solely within the control of the legislature.162  According to 
Frankfurter, “[i]t is hostile to a democratic system to involve the judiciary in 
the politics of the people.”163 
The majority also found the Guarantee Clause of the Constitution164 to be 
an insufficient basis for judicial intervention.165  In a strong stand for the 
separation of powers doctrine, the Court concluded that its hands were tied 
and the “peculiarly political nature” of the dispute was not ripe for judicial 
intervention.166  Stated another way, the Colegrove Court held that the voters’ 
only remedy for the potential unfairness of malapportioned voting districts 
was to elect representatives who would repeal or amend the statute.  Justice 
Frankfurter famously stated, “Courts ought not to enter this political 
thicket.”167 
2.  Baker v. Carr 
In Baker, the Court was asked to determine if Tennessee’s reapportionment 
statute violated voters’ Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights.168  
The federal trial court, relying on Colegrove, held that there “can be no doubt 
that the federal rule . . . is that the federal courts, whether from a lack of 
jurisdiction or from the inappropriateness of the subject matter for judicial 
consideration, will not intervene in cases of this type to compel legislative 
reapportionment.”169  The Supreme Court held otherwise:  the Tennessee 
statute apportioning state representatives based on the 1901 census did indeed 
“deprive[] the [voters] of the equal protection of the laws in violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”170  And because the claim arose under the 
Constitution, the district court erroneously dismissed the claim for want of 
subject matter jurisdiction.171 
While the majority in Colegrove found that a reapportionment challenge 
implicated the Guarantee Clause of the Constitution (which presented a 
nonjusticiable political issue), in Baker, Justice William Brennan, writing for 
the majority, held that the challenge was based on a constitutional equal 
 
 162. Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 556. 
 163. See id. at 553–54. 
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 165. Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 556. 
 166. See id. at 552. 
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protection argument, not the Guarantee Clause.172  The Court outright 
rejected the notion that just because a dispute presents a claim arising from 
the “embodiment of questions that were thought ‘political,’” it must be 
nonjusticiable.173 
Justice Frankfurter wrote a scathing dissent in Baker, calling the majority’s 
opinion “a massive repudiation of the experience of our whole past” and 
accusing the majority of “asserting [a] destructively novel judicial power 
[that] demands a detailed analysis of the role of this Court in our 
constitutional scheme.”174  Echoing his opinion in Colegrove, Frankfurter 
scolded the majority for wading into the political thicket and warned that the 
public perception of the judicial branch as an institution would be harmed by 
intervention in political disputes.175  Frankfurter argued for complete 
detachment from political entanglements and that “abstention from injecting 
itself into the clash of political forces” was necessary to preserve “the Court’s 
position as the ultimate organ of ‘the supreme Law of the Land.’”176 
Frankfurter’s majority opinion in Colegrove and dissenting opinion in 
Baker reveal what he perceived to be a grave threat to federal court 
intervention in election disputes:  the unelected judiciary trumping the 
authority of democratically elected bodies regarding reapportionment. 
B.  An Active Judiciary in Election-Related Litigation 
Today, sixty-five years after Baker, it is clear that the courts have, in fact, 
played a more active role not only in reapportionment litigation but also in 
other areas of election-related disputes.177  Indeed, a significant portion of 
the Court’s current docket deals with the regulation of politics.178  In the first 
ten years of the twenty-first century, election litigation more than doubled 
from the previous decade.179 
The Court’s more aggressive oversight in the election-litigation arena, 
however, has not resulted in a clear vision of what exactly the federal 
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judiciary’s role should be in monitoring the election process.180  Courts 
seemingly handle election-related disputes on an ad hoc basis as new 
questions about the political process arise.181  Many legal scholars have 
examined how the federal judiciary can untangle itself from the political 
thicket. 
One option is simply to exit the “thicket” and drastically reduce judicial 
review in electoral-process disputes.182  Another option is for the courts to 
focus on the partisan nature of the election machinery and to strike down 
attempts by partisan actors to create a less competitive election process.183  A 
third possibility is the creation of impartial tribunals to settle election 
disputes.184 
When judges intervene in election disputes, they “might act in self-interest 
to favor their past or present political party or to keep themselves in office,” 
and “judges come to [election] cases with their own world views and might 
not apply ‘neutral’ principles in deciding election law cases.”185  After 
judicial intervention in an election dispute, the public is left wondering if the 
decision was based on an unbiased application of the law or if the court’s 
decision was tainted by a partisan skew. 
1.  Judicial Partisanship at the State Level 
Election litigation decisions in state court indeed reveal the influence of 
party loyalty on judicial outcomes.  A study by Michael Kang and Joanna 
Shepherd reveals that partisan loyalties “play[] a significant role in how legal 
election disputes are contested and decided.”186  The study focused on state 
court judges because nine out of ten state judges are democratically elected 
rather than appointed.187  The study intended to disentangle partisanship from 
judicial ideology by focusing solely on candidate-driven election 
litigation.188  These cases typically involve obscure questions of law with no 
consistent judicial ideology guiding judges in resolving these disputes.189 
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The study concluded that Democratic judges consistently favor Democrats 
and Republican judges consistently favor Republicans.190  Judges that 
received more campaign donations demonstrated higher party loyalty.191  
Significantly, in high-profile election disputes in which there was more 
public attention on the court’s outcome, partisan loyalty diminished.192  Kang 
and Shepherd attributed this phenomenon to a greater likelihood that the 
public will detect judicial bias and concluded that “[e]ven if judges are prone 
to partisanship in election cases, they are less so when they may be exposed 
as such by the news media or competitive campaigning.”193  Thus, the study 
indicated that if judges fear being perceived as partisan, the effect of judicial 
bias decreases.194  While partisan tendency is perhaps more pronounced in 
state court because judges are often elected, federal judges are not immune 
from the pull of partisan loyalty. 
2.  Judicial Partisanship at the Federal Level 
At the federal level, judges appointed by Democratic Presidents are more 
likely to support liberal causes, while judges appointed by Republican 
Presidents are more likely to support conservative causes.195  This effect is 
more pronounced in “ideologically salient cases like gay rights and 
affirmative action.”196  The partisan divide of federal judges based on the 
party identity of the President that appointed the judge is well documented.197  
While this reality is perhaps unsurprising, the results of this phenomenon in 
election litigation means “a seemingly biased tribunal [is] determin[ing] the 
winner of an election.”198  This might result in the public thinking the court’s 
decision reflected a desired partisan outcome rather than an impartial 
application of the law.199  This undesirable public perception was evident in 
the most well-known election dispute of the twenty-first century:  Bush v. 
Gore.200 
Much scholarly literature has been dedicated to the 2000 presidential 
election and ensuing Bush v. Gore litigation.201  In the midst of a manual 
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recount in four select counties in Florida, Florida’s Secretary of State halted 
the recount because the deadline for county vote returns had passed, and she 
moved to certify George W. Bush as the winner in Florida.202  The Florida 
Supreme Court, however, refused to accept the results of the partial recount 
and ordered the counties to be given more time to complete the recount.203  
After prolonged litigation in which the Florida Supreme Court and the U.S. 
Supreme Court battled for control over the timing of the recount, the U.S. 
Supreme Court eventually decided the recount must be halted, which ensured 
that Bush won the presidency.204 
After the Supreme Court halted the recount, legal commentators from both 
sides of the aisle weighed in on the Court’s handling of the dispute.205  
Despite the Court’s general reluctance to intervene in election disputes, the 
Court intervened twice in this dispute and overruled a state supreme court on 
the application of state law.206  Liberal commentators argued that the 
Republican-appointed Justices on the Supreme Court did not base their 
decisions on the proper application of state law but rather found a way to 
resolve the dispute so that the candidate they supported won the state of 
Florida.207  Conservative commentators countered by arguing that the 
Supreme Court was no more political in its resolution of the dispute than the 
Florida Supreme Court, which was composed almost entirely of Democratic 
appointees.208  After the Supreme Court’s intervention, a group of 554 law 
professors from 120 law schools took out a full-page advertisement in the 
New York Times, which read, “The U.S. Supreme Court Used Its Power To 
Act as Political Partisans, Not Judges of a Court of Law . . . .  [T]he five 
justices [in the majority] were acting as political proponents for candidate 
Bush, not as judges.”209  Many legal scholars have said that the decision in 
Bush v. Gore was a blow to the Court’s legitimacy.210 
By its own terms, Bush v. Gore has little precedential value.211  Many 
election cases, in fact, result in extremely narrow decisions in which the 
Court sets little precedent and the holding of the case is effectively tied only 
to the dispute at bar.212  These narrow rulings make it difficult to determine 
if the judges acted with partisan favor.213  The short-term political 
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consequences of these narrow rulings are clear while the question of how the 
cases might be interpreted in the long-term is unknown.214 
C.  Determining the Appropriate Remedy in Election Litigation 
When courts resolve election disputes, they face a great risk of appearing 
to be political actors, which makes the prescription of appropriate remedies 
particularly important.  The ultimate goal of any election remedy mandated 
by a court is to give effect to the voters’ will and to uncover what candidate 
the voters chose to represent them.215  However, if there is an election 
irregularity, it is often difficult to determine whom the voters would have 
chosen absent that irregularity.216  While election statutes give candidates 
and voters the opportunity to challenge election disputes in state court, these 
statutes rarely give courts guidance on appropriate remedies.217  This has 
resulted in nonuniform jurisprudence for judicial intervention in election 
disputes.218 
Broad legislative mandates give judges wide discretion to determine what 
remedy is appropriate in a particular controversy.219  These ambiguous laws 
not only provide courts with little guidance, but they also allow judges to find 
statutory support for nearly any outcome they desire.220 
In constructing the appropriate remedy, some values a court should be 
mindful of are (1) fairness and legitimacy, (2) voter anonymity, (3) accuracy 
and transparency, (4) promptness and finality, and (5) efficiency and cost.221  
As for fairness and legitimacy, the judicial system must create a public 
perception that it treats all candidates equally.222  The vast majority of states’ 
election-contest statutes, however, make no attempt to ensure that the state-
level decision-maker is impartial.223 
1.  Some States Account for the Risk of Partisan Skew 
Only a few states specifically address the risk of partisan skew through 
statutory election-contest provisions.224  For example, Pennsylvania’s statute 
for challenging the nomination for Governor and Lieutenant Governor in 
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primary and general elections attempts to account for potential 
partisanship.225  The Pennsylvania procedure mandates that a random group 
of members from the Pennsylvania House of Representatives and Senate be 
drawn from a black box to settle an election dispute.226  This mechanism for 
resolving disputes applies only to elections of the Governor and Lieutenant 
Governor, however, and the random selection process ensures only a random 
selection of partisans will settle the dispute.227  While the efficacy of this 
method to produce a nonbiased outcome is questionable, the Pennsylvania 
legislators that approved this method believed it would eliminate the potential 
of bias and corruption.228 
New Hampshire has established a five-member ballot-law commission to 
resolve election-related disputes.229  The commission comprises two 
members chosen by the House of Representatives (each party chooses one), 
two members chosen by the Senate (each party chooses one), and one 
member chosen by the Governor.230  None of the commissioners can be 
elected officials and the Governor’s appointee must have experience with 
election procedures.231 
In West Virginia, a special court resolves election-contest disputes.232  The 
special court consists of three members; one is selected by the contestee, one 
is selected by the contestant, and one is selected by the Governor.233  While 
both sides of a dispute are represented, similar to New Hampshire’s election-
contest resolution system, the Governor’s appointee may tilt the impartiality 
of the tribunal.234 
The Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, and West Virginia statutes are 
examples of state attempts to account for the risk that the decision-maker in 
an election dispute will be swayed by party loyalty.  In other states, absent 
clear guidelines and with no mechanism in place to ensure some degree of 
partiality, judges are free to hide their partisan bias behind ambiguous 
statutory commands. 
2.  New York Election Law 
New York election law is an example of an ambiguous and open-ended 
statutory mandate.  Section 16-100 grants the trial court broad powers to 
review “any question of law or fact arising as to any subject set forth in this 
article, which shall be construed liberally.”235  This broad language provides 
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judges with little guidance on the outer limits of appropriate judicial 
intervention in election disputes. 
Additionally, New York election law provides no means to ensure the 
impartiality of election-litigation decisions because the trial court has 
jurisdiction to hear election-related claims.236  New York trial court judges 
are elected in partisan elections and serve fourteen-year terms.237 
III.  REEXAMINING PIDOT AND RETHINKING REMEDIES 
Despite concluding that Pidot deserved to be on the ballot as a candidate 
for the Republican nomination in New York’s third congressional district, 
both the state court and federal court failed to provide Pidot—or voters—
with any judicial relief.238  The judicial system’s determination that it could 
not provide any remedy in this dispute resulted in the court, not the voters, 
choosing the Republican Party’s representative for the general election.239  
Part III.A scrutinizes the Second Circuit’s decision in Pidot and argues that 
the court’s reliance on the Rivera-Powell doctrine was misguided.  Part III.B 
proposes that federal courts should expressly adopt a test to provide more 
clarity on when federal court intervention is appropriate in candidate-litigated 
election disputes. 
While the current default in federal courts is nonintervention, in certain 
cases, such as Pidot, nonintervention leads to the undesirable result that the 
court, not the people, chooses the winner of an election.  Such a result may 
reinforce a perception that the court is a political actor.  Increased clarity 
regarding how federal courts resolve election disputes will help combat the 
perception of bias in the resolution of election-related disputes. 
A.  The Second Circuit’s Misguided Decision in Pidot 
The Second Circuit, in reversing the district court’s decision to schedule a 
new primary, relied on the Rivera-Powell doctrine.240  The court held that the 
voters’ constitutional claims were not viable because the state corrective 
procedures in place were adequate.241  Therefore, the plaintiffs (Republican 
voters who had been unable to cast a ballot in a primary) could not assert a 
First Amendment claim in federal court because the state law and procedures 
protected their due process rights.242  The Second Circuit was wrong because 
neither the plaintiffs, nor any other voter, had standing to challenge an 
invalidated candidacy under New York election law—only an aggrieved 
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2017] A VOTE FOR CLARITY 1387 
candidate, like Pidot, could raise such a challenge.243  The voter-plaintiffs in 
Pidot never had an opportunity to assert their rights before a state or federal 
court.  The Second Circuit held that the established state procedures protected 
the voters’ rights, even though the voters had no recourse under New York 
election law.244 
The Second Circuit treated the disenfranchised voters as equivalent to the 
candidate who had the opportunity to challenge the Board of Election’s 
invalidation of his designating petition in state court.  In doing so, the court 
misapplied Rivera-Powell to the plaintiffs and improperly barred them from 
asserting their constitutional claim in federal court. 
Moreover, the Second Circuit improperly equated the voters’ First 
Amendment claim with a due process claim in state court.  Pidot never 
alleged a due process deprivation in state court.  Indeed, he won his case to 
overturn the Board’s erroneous invalidation of his designating petition.  In 
reversing the district court’s order mandating a Republican primary with both 
Pidot and Martins on the ballot—and thus stripping Republican voters in the 
third congressional district of a choice—the Second Circuit obviated the 
democratic process and determined the Republican Party nominee for 
Congress. 
Pidot had no reason to allege inadequate due process at the state level 
because the process in place led to a state court victory.  As the district court 
correctly stated, “The plaintiffs are not asking the Court to review and reject 
the state court judgment.”245  Pidot and his coplaintiffs were asking the 
federal court to reschedule the primary election to ensure that their 
constitutionally protected right to vote was not violated.246 
Rivera-Powell presents a wholly inapposite dispute.  The plaintiffs in 
Rivera-Powell alleged a First Amendment violation because of the state’s 
application of a statute.247  The First Amendment violation was a result of 
the alleged misapplication of a New York law dictating how a candidate can 
be listed on the ballot.248  Pidot contains no corollary because the candidate 
effectively used the established state corrective procedures to review the 
Board of Election’s determination.  Pidot did not challenge the application of 
a state law but rather challenged the Board’s determination that his 
designating petition was deficient in accordance with New York state law.249  
Whereas in Rivera-Powell the court held that the candidate’s First 
Amendment claim was “indistinguishable” from the due process claim, in 
Pidot the candidate alleged no due process violation and therefore the First 
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Amendment claim was separate and distinct from any maladies in the state 
process.250 
Voters in New York’s third congressional district were stripped of their 
right to select between two qualified Republican candidates in a primary 
election.  But, the Second Circuit’s brief opinion does not consider whether 
the state court’s inability to provide any remedy to the voters resulted in 
fundamental unfairness.  Furthermore, the Second Circuit failed to justify the 
adequacy of the state court’s decision that it was powerless to provide any 
remedy.  Simply put, the Second Circuit determined that because the 
candidate was afforded due process, there were no additional viable 
constitutional claims to be sustained in federal court. 
The federal court essentially affirmed the state court’s decision that it could 
not provide Pidot any remedy.  At both the state and federal levels, judicial 
resolution meant a judge was forced to side with one candidate over the other. 
While judicial intervention may place the court in the unfavorable position 
of “kingmaker,” Pidot reveals that nonintervention can have an identical 
effect.  Only judicial intervention could have ensured that voters in New 
York’s third congressional district could choose between two eligible 
candidates for the nomination.  Nonintervention resulted in the courts, not 
the enrolled Republican Party voters, determining who would represent the 
party in the general election. 
B.  A Need for Federal Judicial Intervention 
The recent increase in election-related litigation has resulted in the federal 
judiciary becoming more involved in elections.251  Candidate-driven election 
litigation, like Pidot, in which arcane questions of law are challenged, is not 
uncommon.  This reality inevitably entangles the courts and judges in the 
political thicket which runs the risk of damaging judicial legitimacy.  When 
federal courts decide election disputes, the public may perceive this 
intervention as undemocratic.  While this risk exists at the state level, states 
have always been able to control their own elections, and state legislatures 
delegate authority to state courts to resolve election-related disputes.252  
Federalism concerns are unique to federal court intervention in which the 
federal judiciary invades an arena typically reserved for the states.253 
While some scholars have suggested that the federal judiciary should 
completely exit the political thicket,254 others have argued that the federal 
court should only intervene to examine whether features of the election-
administration process are inherently unfair.255  This Note concludes that the 
current features of state election codes—unclear and nonuniform guidelines 
for courts—require that the federal judiciary remain involved in resolving 
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election disputes to ensure that voters’ First Amendment right to association 
is protected. 
1.  Establishing a Clear Federal Standard 
When federal courts decide whether to intervene in election disputes in 
which a candidate or voters allege a constitutional deprivation based on some 
irregularity in the voting process, they typically look to the adequacy of the 
state corrective procedure and whether nonintervention would result in 
fundamental unfairness to the voters.256  A review of federal cases reveals 
that federal courts are hesitant to intervene.  This result indicates that federal 
courts recognize the inherent federalism and separation of powers issues that 
arise with their intervention.  While the default rule is nonintervention, in 
certain extraordinary circumstances courts are willing to intervene to protect 
voters’ and candidates’ constitutional rights.257 
In examining circuit court decisions in which federal courts have 
determined whether intervention is appropriate, there is no clear, universal 
standard applied.  However, federal courts do consistently look to two factors 
to determine if intervention is appropriate:  (1) the adequacy of the state 
corrective procedure and (2) the fundamental unfairness that would result 
from nonintervention.258  This two-factor test should be explicitly applied in 
candidate-litigated election disputes.  Courts already typically look to these 
two factors when determining if intervention is appropriate, but a court need 
not reference these factors (or any others) in ultimately concluding whether 
intervention is appropriate. 
Clear judicial standards that determine when intervention is necessary will 
provide candidates and voters with more confidence that the court’s decision 
is based on established equitable principles rather than partisan 
considerations. 
2.  Bias and the Adequacy of the State Corrective Procedure 
State election codes include complex requirements for the regulation of 
elections.259  Judicial review mechanisms in these state statutes establish 
ways in which voters or candidates can challenge some aspect of the election 
administration.  Generally, these judicial review statutes are broad and give 
courts little guidance on the appropriate remedy in a particular instance.260  
Additionally, the vast majority of states do not account for the possibility that 
the decision-maker in an election dispute will be skewed by potential partisan 
bias.261  However, studies of judicial decisions at the state level reveal that 
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Democratic judges often side with Democrats in election disputes, while 
Republican judges often side with Republicans.262  Ambiguous state statutes 
permit judges to find statutory support for almost any conclusion they wish 
to reach. 
Because the pull of partisan bias is so clearly documented in studies of 
election-dispute decisions, this reality should factor into the adequacy of the 
state corrective procedure.  For example, in New Hampshire and West 
Virginia, which have created some sort of neutral tribunal to settle election 
disputes,263 federal courts can be more confident that the state procedure was 
adequate.  While these tribunals in their current form still run the risk of a 
partisan tilt,264 there are, at the very least, decision-makers representing both 
sides of the dispute.  When a federal court determines whether the state has 
provided adequate corrective procedures, the use of a neutral tribunal to 
resolve a dispute lends credibility to the process.  Because so few states have 
an established mechanism by which some modicum of impartiality is 
assured, this factor should not be dispositive.  Rather, use of a neutral tribunal 
should be one of many factors considered by courts in determining the 
adequacy of state corrective procedures. 
Explicit consideration of the adequacy and impartiality of the state 
corrective procedure in federal court decreases the likelihood that the public 
will perceive judicial intervention as motivated by partisan bias.  An 
established federal test will provide greater uniformity in the federal courts 
and greater public confidence that judicial intervention in election disputes is 
not politically motivated. 
CONCLUSION 
The risk of partisan bias in election-related litigation may lead courts to 
play an improper political role when resolving election disputes.  While 
federal courts have traditionally been hesitant to intervene in election-related 
cases because elections are run by the states, the twenty-first century has seen 
a dramatic increase in the occurrence of election-related litigation.  Much of 
this increase is attributable to candidate-driven litigation in which candidates 
challenge obscure provisions of state election laws.  Despite the increase in 
litigation, federal courts have maintained a default rule of nonintervention 
subject to occasional exceptions. 
In the rare instances in which federal courts do intervene, a pattern 
emerges.  These courts look to the adequacy of the state corrective procedure 
and to whether the state action resulted in fundamental unfairness to the 
candidate or voters.  However, this test is not explicit and—as in Pidot—the 
court need not consider these factors or any others when deciding whether to 
intervene.  Federal courts should explicitly apply this two-factor test when 
determining whether intervention is appropriate.  An established test will 
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reduce the risk that the public will perceive judicial intervention as motivated 
by partisan bias. 
Additionally, in determining the adequacy of the state corrective 
procedure, federal courts should look to see if any mechanisms existed to 
ensure the impartiality of the state decision-makers.  The risk of judges 
deciding a case with a partisan skew is real, and federal courts should account 
for this possibility when determining whether the state process was adequate.  
A clear federal test to determine when intervention is appropriate will provide 
candidates and the public more confidence that the judiciary is fulfilling its 
obligation of impartial protection of the First Amendment right to vote. 
 
